Alliance Géostratégique

John Greenway (United Kingdom) has been a Member of Parliament for Ryedale (North Yorkshire) since June 1987. He is the author of numerous reports of the Assembly. In particular, together with Mr Muñoz Alonso (Spain), he recently submitted a report on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on “European security and enlargement: shifts in public opinion” (Document 2054) which was adopted during the December 2009 plenary session of the European Security and Defence Assembly. He is also the Chairman of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly.

Turkey’s foreign and security policy could be a real asset for Europe. As a veritable bridge between East and West, Turkey holds a key geostrategic position: Europe would be wrong to deprive itself of such an asset. Not only is Turkey an active participant in several EU crisis-management operations and a major partner in the NATO operation in Afghanistan, it is also an important transit country for energy imports into Europe and a key player in any solution to the Middle East conflict. Turkish relations with Armenia are also improving, which could help in resolving the long-standing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Turkey’s security policy and EU-NATO relations

As a NATO member state and a pillar of western defence in Europe, Turkey’s quest for EU accession dates back to 1963. The question of its accession to the European Union may raise concerns of a social, economic or cultural nature, but in terms of European common security and defence, Turkey can make a significant contribution to the EU given its geopolitical situation, wise diplomacy and substantial military strength.

However, the Turkish authorities feel that the public at large, in both the EU and Turkey, is suffering from enlargement fatigue or becoming distinctly lukewarm about the project. Both the European public and European leaders have shown growing hesitation towards further enlargement and the conditions to be met for accession seem continually to be raised to more stringent levels than for other candidate countries.

Turkey has been a dedicated member of NATO since 1952 and an important and committed actor in a lot of international military missions. Turkey has NATO’s second largest army and is currently contributing troops in Afghanistan. The only Muslim country within NATO, Turkey has participated in ISAF from the outset and held the command three times: in 2002, 2005 and since last November. Although it has 1 750 soldiers in Afghanistan, however, it has never agreed to be directly involved in combat operations against insurgents. The Turkish Government, conscious of the need to show consideration for the Muslim sensibilities of its electorate, has focused its action on several non-military types of action: responsibility for police tasks in Kabul, management of a training programme for the Afghan police and judicial authorities, participation in secondary school education and in numerous reconstruction efforts for the Afghan state, and participation, as an observer, in the European Gendarmerie Force.

Nevertheless, the Cyprus issue has complicated efforts to improve EU-NATO cooperation. For example, due to the problems in EU-NATO relations, there is no comprehensive EU-NATO agreement on the provision by ISAF of security for the EUPOL staff and no possibility to exchange classified and often vital information. As a consequence, EUPOL has had to conclude individual agreements with Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) lead nations and has even been obliged to hire a private company to guarantee its security and to adopt an extremely tight security policy. Moreover, Turkey and the US have not concluded technical bilateral agreements with it. All this has slowed down EUPOL’s deployment and hampered its effectiveness.

A number of recent Council decisions on a technical level may help to address some of the abovementioned problems, but more steps, including of a political nature, will need to be taken in the near future. The EU could take initiatives which might lead to a solution by granting Turkey a status comparable to that which it enjoyed as an associate member of the Western European Union (WEU) and which, to Turkey’s great regret and resentment, it was not granted in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) structures. Indeed Turkey is currently involved in several EU-led crisis-management operations, in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in Kosovo. Turkey points out that this would be a win-win situation for both parties if we want to achieve a peaceful and stable Europe that is an effective player on the world stage.

Regarding the negotiations for Turkey’s EU accession, since the start of talks in October 2005 12 out of the 35 negotiating chapters have already been opened, but eight of them have been frozen by the EU since 2006 due to Turkey’s non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, an EU member state. Turkey refuses in particular to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot ships and aircraft. In January, Herman Von Rompuy, President of the EU Council, re-emphasised the EU’s willingness to facilitate a solution in the Cyprus reunification negotiations saying, “The settlement of the Cyprus issue is important for the EU as well. A comprehensive, just and viable settlement of the Cyprus issue, in line with UN Security Council resolutions, would not only allow unification of Cyprus but also send a strong positive signal to the whole region”.

Furthermore, France is currently opposed to opening those chapters that presuppose accession: on the euro, agriculture, the budget, institutions and regional policy. The French but also German authorities, to Turkey’s bitter disappointment, are talking about developing a “privileged partnership” with it rather than granting it full EU membership.

Europe’s energy dependence and the role of Turley as a key transit country

At a time when European gas and oil reserves are becoming depleted (Norway, United Kingdom, Netherlands), Europe has on its eastern flank a number of hydrocarbon-producing countries with major reserves. Russia is the world’s first oil producer, accounting for more than 10% of world oil reserves, but it is also the leading gas producer, making it invaluable to Europe. While it may be invaluable, however, it is not unique. Europe can also count on the countries of central Asia and the Near East, two regions which are not that far from the EU. Iran, for example, is the world’s fourth gas and oil producer. Uzbekistan is the 11^th gas producer, followed by Turkmenistan in 13^th and Kazakhstan in 25^th place. Kazakhstan is the world’s 18^th oil producer but it still has major reserves in addition to promising new discoveries. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan also figure among the top 50 oil producers, not to mention Iraq whose long-term ambition is to supply Europe via the land route.

The two ongoing major pipeline projects for the supply of gas to Europe – Nabucco and South Stream – will pass through Turkey, which plays a pivotal role as a transit country.

Since 2004 the Nabucco gas pipeline linking Europe with the Caspian Sea has been one of the EU’s priority infrastructure projects. For Ankara it is also a new way of bringing pressure to bear in the EU accession negotiations as well as being a major source of tax revenue. The project was launched in 2007 but the negotiations only made real progress in summer 2009 with the signing of an intergovernmental agreement making provision for the construction between 2010 and 2014 of more than 3 300 km of gas pipeline between central Asia and the Middle East on the one hand, and Europe on the other, Azerbaijan having agreed to supply the gas. But for this project, which totally excludes Russia, to be profitable, other supplier countries are needed, such as Iraq, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, or even Iran, provided that it is possible to resolve the various disputes with it.

In parallel Russia is working hard on its own project in cooperation with the Italian company ENI. The project, which has been christened South Stream, aims as of 2015 to link Russia and Bulgaria via the Black Sea. Russia wants to steal a march on Europe by diversifying its own energy routes in order to circumvent the Ukraine and Belarus routes in particular, while at the same time putting obstacles in the way of any project that does not pass through Russia. The gas pipelines built recently by the Russians and Germans north of Europe and together with Turkey to the south of Europe are part and parcel of that strategy. When Turkey agreed, with conditions attached, to the Nabucco project, Russia reacted as of 2006 by stepping up the negotiations on the new South Stream pipeline. On 7 August 2009, Russia signed an agreement with Turkey on the launch of the South Stream pipeline construction work in Turkish territorial waters.

Current state of Turkish Armenian relations

The signing of the protocols to establish diplomatic relations and the development of relations by the Turkish and the Armenian Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Zurich on 10 October 2009, concluded two years of bilateral negotiations conducted under Swiss mediation. This first intergovernmental text ever signed between Turkey and Armenia since the Treaty of Kars on 13 October 1921, is a positive development in the South Caucasus where the status quo characterised by conflicts, blockades and trade restrictions is far from satisfactory.

The protocols establish the ground for establishing diplomatic ties, opening the common border and improving bilateral and human-to-human relations according to a set of principles and a timetable. It would be naive and misleading to assume that the texts aim at full normalisation and an overnight settlement of all problems between Turkey and Armenia. The ratification of the protocols by the parliaments of both countries would only be a start to the reconciliation process between the two countries.

Today the process, however, seems to be in a vacuum. Ahmet Davutoğlu, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs introduced the protocols to the Parliament in October 2009, with a speech, depicting the recognition of the border as a major gain for Turkey. The protocol on the establishment of diplomatic relations confirms the mutual recognition of the existing border between the two countries as defined by the relevant treaties of international law. However the minister’s speech did not explicitly urge Parliament’s ratification – which is still awaited.

On 12 January 2010, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia declared its decision of constitutional conformity on the protocols with a short statement. However, it is important to bear in mind that the signatures of ministers Nalbantyan and Davutoğlu ended the negotiation process. The bottom line is that the court merely decided that the protocols are in compliance with the Constitution of Armenia but did not spell out this final decision on this issue.

In March 2010, the Armenian Government sent the ratification papers to parliament for approval. Some new voices evoke the eventuality, as slight as it may be, that Armenia has taken the initiative by ratifying the protocols. However the National Assembly of Armenia began debating on 23 February 2010 a government bill that would make it easier for Armenia to annul its normalisation agreements with Turkey if Ankara continues to delay their ratification.

Another factor affecting developments is the vote of a resolution calling on President Obama to “characterise the systematic and deliberate annihilation of 1.5 million Armenians in 1915 a genocide”, which passed in the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs on 4 March 2010 despite efforts by the White House and the State Department not to press ahead with the vote. Though the issue is not expected to go to the House Floor, as a first result US-Turkish ties have been significantly strained and as a first response Turkey has recalled its Ambassador from Washington DC, whilst at the same time freezing efforts to strengthen defence, energy and trade ties with the US.

It is, however, uncertain how the US vote will directly affect Turkish-Armenian ties at this stage. There are two aspects to consider, firstly Turkey’s renewed role as a regional power; particularly in the past year where we have witnessed its foreign policy moving away from the west and concentrating on developing relations with its direct neighbours – this policy would therefore indicate that though the US vote is a blow to US-Turkish relations it would not severely affect the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation plans. However, a secondary factor is the fierce lobbying of the influential Armenian diaspora which has been no doubt quite effective in the US in securing the vote; this could bring the current fragile Turkish-Armenian relations back to a halt.

The process of normalising Turkish-Armenian relations and the resolution of Karabakh cannot be inter-linked. None of the members of the OSCE Minsk Group seem ready to accept a change of the format of negotiations. Despite the six meetings held in 2009, Armenia and Azerbaijan only reached an agreement on the wording of the preamble of the updated version of the 2007 Madrid Principles in Sochi on 25 January.

The normalisation of Turkish-Armenian relations has the capacity to foster new dynamics in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, the most intractable, and among the biggest obstacles to region-wide cooperation. At this stage, the interruption of Turkish-Armenian bilateral relations will dissipate the international attention focused on the region and decrease the chances of reaching an agreement on the conflict over Karabakh in the foreseeable future.

If the window of opportunity is lost and the process is interrupted, the prospect of establishing normal state-to-state relations between Turkey and Armenia could be lost for many years. The exchange of messages between presidents Gül and Sarkisian on 7-11 February 2010 reasserted the adherence on both sides to the primary provisions of these protocols and stressed the existence of a shared political will to complete the process that was jointly initiated. The necessity to stand behind words and to support words by deeds were emphasised by Presidents Gül and Sarkisian, as well as the reciprocal commitment to honour commitments and display political courage and vision. The personal reinvolvement of the presidents of both countries will hopefully push the issue of normalisation of bilateral relations beyond domestic politics. There is a pressing need to support the decision-making process with practical and symbolic steps that will prepare people mentally for the opening of the border.

Turkey and the Middle East conflict

Turkish diplomacy is highly active when it comes to the Middle East conflict, offering its good offices to the West and acting as a bridge between the latter and its Muslim neighbours. Turkey has always endeavoured to strike a balance in its relations with the Arab states of the region, on the one hand, and Israel, on the other. It can play an important role in finding a settlement to the Middle East conflict and the Turkish Government makes every effort to do that.

Turkey and Israel

Turkey has historic ties with the Jewish people going back over 500 years. Turkey and Israel are the only non-Arab countries of the western Middle East and are engaged in intensive relations on a number of basic issues at the political, military and commercial levels, based essentially on pragmatic considerations. Israel sees Turkish mediation as the visible proof of its positive role in bringing Syria and Israel together and it would seem that notwithstanding recent public incidents, this is a door that has not been closed.

Israel of course wants to preserve its good relations with Turkey, but for Turkey to continue to be a useful mediator in the disputes between Israel and its neighbours there must be good personal relations among the Turkish and Israeli leaders, which does not appear to be the case for the moment. Nonetheless Turkey remains, if not a major intermediary, at least an important adviser and partner for the United States in this region.

In October 2009, Turkey cancelled Israel’s involvement in its Anatolian Eagle Air Force exercise, for technical reasons according to a government spokesman. Some analysts consider that Turkey seems to want to distance itself from Israel, while drawing closer to its Muslim neighbours, having realised that it has more to gain by trying to restore the weight it carried in the region during the time of the old Ottoman Empire. However, military ties between Turkey and Israel remain strong. Israel continues to use Turkish air space for training its pilots and two important cooperation programmes are underway for the upgrading by Israel of Turkish M60 tanks and F16 aircraft.

Hamas and the disputes among the Arab states

Turkey sees Hamas as a political reality and hence argues that no stable or comprehensive peace can be achieved as long as the situation in Gaza is ignored. It has no intention of interfering in the mediation efforts that Egypt is currently conducting between Fatah and Hamas, but is willing to do everything it can to support the efforts aimed at reconciliation between the two factions. It takes the view that peace and stability in the region require the settlement of disputes between and among Arab states.

Iran’s nuclear programme

Turkey takes the view that the West is applying a policy of double standards in the present crisis over Iran’s nuclear activities, arguing that every other country that is a signatory to the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) is allowed to have a civilian nuclear programme. Acquisition of nuclear weapons would not necessarily improve Iran’s security or that of the region. In its diplomatic contacts with Iran, Turkey tries to adopt a more moderate stance than many western countries and to create opportunities for a pragmatic dialogue. Turkey believes that both Iran and Syria must endeavour to improve cooperation with the IAEA, and is trying to create an atmosphere in which both of those countries can improve their relations with western countries and with the IAEA. Turkey is opposed to sanctions, far preferring the diplomatic route.

Turkey has economic and strategic interests in common with Iran. Iran is the second largest supplier of gas to Turkey, after Russia, and there is substantial trade between Turkey and Iran. The two countries have a shared interest in the struggle against the PKK, which is active on both sides of the border.

Disarmament and non-proliferation

Turkey is in favour of transforming the Middle East into a non-nuclear weapon zone and has always supported United Nations Security Council Resolutions to that end. It is aware, however, that this is a goal that can only be achieved once there is a comprehensive and lasting peace between Israel and all its neighbours.

Conclusion

Turkey is actively increasing its diplomacy in the Middle East, the South Caucasus, central Asia and beyond. The country favours a proactive security policy in the region. Turkish Government ministers are working with their counterparts in Iraq to restore bilateral institutional and economic relations, and for several years now Turkey has had good neighbourly relations with Syria. These two developments show that as far as the Kurdish question is concerned, normality is being restored – something that seemed unimaginable just five years ago. Trade with Iran has been growing and a protocol signed (but yet to be ratified) with Armenia aims to reopen the borders between the two countries. It is up to the EU member states to take on board and make every effort to encourage these recent positive developments.

I believe that Turkey is a special and important partner for the EU and that in the long term its role in the area of security and defence can only strengthen Europe as a power in the making. This reality gives rise to acute political difficulties for governments in the West, where public sentiment with regard to Turkey’s accession is at best negative. Yet a detailed and pragmatic analysis of the facts will show that Turkey’s current foreign and security policy is an asset. My report concludes that this fact alone would justify speeding up the process of Turkey’s accession to the European Union.