Alliance Géostratégique

After Menekse Tokyay (“L’Islam peut aussi s’approprier le projet européen”), Ekavi Athanassopoulou (“The crux of the issue is Turkey’s size and enormous potential”) and the Jeunes Européens – France (Candidature turque : “L’Europe doit maintenant affirmer son ambition”), Kadri Kaan Renda, doctoral student in European Studies Department at King’s College London, gives us his point of view on Turkey and its relations with the European Union.

Can you summarize the current economic and political relations between the EU and Turkey?

The European Union (EU) has always played a crucial role in Turkish economy and politics in one way or other. This is of course not accidental. Needless to say, the Turkey-EU relations commenced as an economic cooperation with political and strategic considerations in minds of both parties. The reasons behind the establishment of the Customs Union in 1995 are not only economic but also political. Since then the EU is Turkey’s most important trade partner. More than half of Turkey’s trade is with the EU and Turkey is economically the most integrated candidate into the EU’s economic structures with ironically no rights in the decision-making process.

Since the twin crisis of November 2000 and February 2001 in Turkey, this latter has been searching for new markets in order to diversify its trade and increase trade volume with non-EU members. Some experts on Turkey argue that its quest for new partners implies a divergence between the economic interests of Turkey and the EU. On the contrary, I believe the rise of Turkey as a trading state in world economy would strengthen the economic power of the EU by helping it to reach out to the countries in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

The EU has been acting as a catalyst for democratization process in Turkey. As a result of direct and indirect support of the EU to the development of democracy through the membership criteria and political conditionality, Turkey has adopted many reforms that have profoundly transformed Turkish political system, relations between state and its citizens, and the role of military in domestic affairs. It is highly likely that the EU remains a key factor in the consolidation of Turkish democracy.

How do you assess the progress of Turkish candidacy to EU membership since the opening of the negotiations in October 2005?

Turkey-EU relations have been floundering since the negotiations began in October 2005. The Turkey’s avowed intent remains to be a full member of the EU. Many Turkish governments have expressed their support for EU membership on several occasions.The commencement of negotiations was at first regarded as a prelude to a profound transformation in Turkish society and politics; however, the Turkey-EU relations have been suffering from a political fatigue and lost their momentum owing to domestic and institutional problems of each party. On the EU side, the ratification of still-born ‘constitutional treaty’ by member states consumed a lot of energy of the EU until the Lisbon Treaty, a new revised version of constitutional treaty, finally signed in the end of 2009. Meanwhile, the Turkish politicians paid more attention to domestic issues such as presidential and general elections, closure case against governing party (AKP) and conflicts in the vicinity of Turkey such as the future of Iraq, Palestinian issue and the conflicts in Transcaucasia.

It seems more obvious now than before that the opening of negotiations was the beginning of an era in which both the EU and Turkey turned their attention away from each other to issues deemed more vital for political and geostrategic reasons. Consequently, the negotiations have lost their momentum, and relegated to low-key technical meetings between low level officials. Even though there has been some significant progress in some of the chapters at the technical level, the negotiations at the political level seem to reach an impasse which can only be broken by the political will of both parties.

Does Turkish public opinion support this candidacy? Could it accept/understand a negative answer?

The Turkish public reposed a lot of hope and trust in the EU membership when Turkey became a candidate in 1999. Nonetheless, that hope and trust faded away in time due to the EU’s ineffective strategy in dealing with the Cyprus question and the rise of Turkoscepticism and Islamophobia in Europe.

The Turkish public support for EU membership has waxed and waned with the changing prospect of Turkish members hip and how well Turkey does on its own in economic and political terms without the support of the EU. The credibility of the EU in the eyes of Turkish public has been negatively affected by the lack of political will on the EU side to accept Turkey as a full member in the foreseeable future.The EU recently seems less attractive to Turkish public and the membership has been widely considered just a chimera, a dream that is unlikely ever to come true by a significant amount of Turkish population.

The shift in political attention to other issues accompanied by declining public support for EU membership have resulted in a political and social frustration and fatigue that slowed down the negotiation process. In my opinion, an enhanced social dialogue alongside a political dialogue will give a much-needed boost to the public support for Turkey-EU relations.

The most common people’s expectation in Turkey is to live in a country which would not revert to being undemocratic and illiberal even if it was rejected by the EU at the end of negotiations. If Turkey could consolidate its democracy and economy in the near future, a negative answer would not cause great damage to Turkish politics, but it would certainly wreck Turkey-EU relations in political as well as economic terms.

How can the relative slowness of the process be explained? What are the main obstacles (in Europe and on the domestic scene) on Turkey’s road to full membership?

While the aspiration to become a member of the EU remains as one of the objectives of Turkish governments, the EU accession negotiations seems a disappointment to Turkish public. The EU insists on reforms and the extension of Customs Union to all member states while politically signalling a sense of unwillingness to accept Turkey into the Union. Whereas Turkey has erred by not fully complying with the EU acquis communautaire regarding the Customs Union, the EU has done so by obscuring the Turkish prospect of membership through putting forward new ill-defined concepts namely ‘privileged partnership’ and ‘absorption capacity’. Moreover, there is concern that even if Turkey adopts every bits of EU acquis communautaire, the member states have the means to inhibit Turkish accession to the Union by their veto powers or by holding a referendum on Turkish membership, which compounds to the slowness of the negotiation process.

I shall argue that what appears to be irreconcilable conflicts can be resolved once and for all providing the political will on the both parties. The main aim should be to find a way to move on from recurring controversies and stalemate through mutual learning and mutual understanding. A leadership that cultivates inclusion of Turkey into the EU is decisive to overcome many hurdles. At the moment, there are politicians on both sides who are devoid of political will and decisive leadership to learn from past experience as well as each others’ concerns and policies. What is much-needed nowadays is to enhance political dialogue which is based on deliberation and mutual understanding rather than shunning, exclusion or demeaning, and in the meantime to develop a social dialogue as a mechanism for facilitating coordination and cooperation between Turkey and the EU at all levels.

More particularly, what do you think of the mutual influence between Turkish candidacy and the Cyprus « conflict »?

After the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004, the Cyprus question has been discussed at a new level which includes the EU as one of the parties of the prolonged question. For a long time, Turkey argued strongly that it did not have to solve the Cyprus question in order to become a member. Since the accession of Cyprus to the EU as a divided island became an option, it has become extremely hard for Turkey to hold on that strategy.

I believe the resolution of Cyprus question rests on two factors: timing and political will. First of all, Turkey seems reluctant to adopt the additional protocol as long as there is a fair resolution to the Cyprus problem. Turkish policy-makers insist that the EU has to fulfil its commitments regarding the lifting of economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. Whereas the Turkish Cypriots seized the opportunity to live in a unified island in the 2004 referendum, the Greek Cypriots preferred to enter the EU as a divided island with hoping that they would gain more leverage against Turkish Cypriots. Hence, unless the EU shows a renewed interest in lifting of isolation imposed on Turkish Cypriots, Turkey would not deploy necessary efforts to solve Cyprus question. Secondly, only the political will and decisive leadership on both parties can facilitate the resolution of the problem once and for all. The European politicians should realize that a fair resolution of Cyprus problem will pave the way for settlement of most of the conflicts in the Balkans, the Middle East and Transcaucasia.

What are the main benefits that Turkey can expect from its integration into the EU?

The old-fashioned, dictated by the 1980 coup political edifice of Turkey and a political arena exclusively designated for military and bureaucratic elites have been superseded by more liberal, civilian politicians and de-securitized politics politics due to the reforms done by the Turkish government in response to EU conditionality. The main benefit of integration into the EU would be the consolidation of the recent reforms that have transformed Turkey into a more democratic and liberal country. Moreover, the influence of Turkey in regional and international arena would extend and Turkey would enjoy stability and peace at domestic and international level as the EU membership would work like a safety valve.

What do you think of the idea according to which Turkey does not belong to Europe for historical, cultural or religious reasons?

As Turkey became much closer to the EU in political and economic terms, the cultural and religious reasons have risen to the top of list of objection to Turkish membership. The solution for this superficial problem rests on the European society and politicians. They are the ones who have to come up with a compromise that realizes the place of Islam in Europe and current and prospective contributions of Islam and Turkey to the political standards and geostrategic importance of the EU. Stigmatizing Turkey on the basis of cultural and religious differences would not be to the benefit of the EU as whole. The EU would err in rejecting to accommodate Islam in European civilization, if Turkish membership was objected even implicitly on the ground of being a Muslim country. Consequently, the rift between the Muslim world and Europe will be widened and the EU will lose a great opportunity to extend its sphere of influence to Muslim countries.

What can Turkey bring to the Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy and more generally on international affairs and defense?

Since the establishment of the European security and defence policy in the end of the 1990s, the EU has turned to its vicinity in order to address the issues that cause significant unrest within the Wider Europe. Needless to say, such a broad and long-term objective cannot be achieved without giving credit to Turkish role as one of the most important actor in the promotion of democracy and liberal values in the Wider Europe. The denial of Turkish role and interests can constrain the EU from playing a leading role.

Turkey and the EU have vested interests in cooperating and coordinating their policies in the region. Both sides can learn from each other. Whereas some Europeans are still reluctant to embroil in international affairs and regional conflicts as much as they can, sooner or later the EU has to take up a high profile role in which case a partner like Turkey which has powerful standing army and skilful diplomats will provide the cultural, social and even political ties with other countries. The Turkish role has been already proved in her peace promoting efforts in the Balkans, the Black sea region and the Middle East. While the cost of Turkish membership seems high at the moment, over time it would be reduced and liabilities would become assets for the EU.

The new activism in Turkish foreign policy can be considered as a facilitator enabling the European Neighbourhood policy to spread into the region. Despite the criticisms of shift in Turkey’s foreign policy paradigm from the West or rather the EU, to the East, particularly to the Middle eastern countries and Russia, the only obstacle seems to me is the inefficient coordination and lack of cooperation mechanisms between the EU and Turkey with regard to defence and security policy.

Interview by JGP, Mon Blog Défense

Kadri Kaan Renda is a doctoral student in European Studies Department at King’s College London. His doctoral research focuses on the changing character of Turkish policy-makers’ perceptions of defence and security during the EU accession process. His main research interests are Turkey-EU relations, Turkish foreign policy, European Security and Defence Policy. Some of his works have been published online by the Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis. He can be contacted at: kadri.renda@kcl.ac.uk.